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1. Introduction 
 It is clear that Leibniz’s philosophy was very important for Kant. This importance is 
reflected, for example, in the number of Kant’s explicit references to Leibniz. He is the most 
mentioned philosopher in Kant’s corpus overall.1 What is much less clear is in what ways Leibniz 
was important for Kant, and how exactly the relation between Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophy 
should be understood. 
 The historian of philosophy who is trying to clarify this relation is faced with various kinds 
of difficulties. To begin with, it is not easy to determine which of Leibniz’s own writings Kant 
had access to, and even less easy to say which of them he actually read. More generally, in 
Kant’s treatment of broadly speaking Leibnizian themes his sources and targets are often 
unclear. Is his discussion aimed at Leibniz himself, or at later Leibnizians (broadly conceived)? If 
we hope to understand Kant’s relation to Leibniz, we have no choice but also to investigate 
Kant’s relation to these later Leibnizians, and their relations to Leibniz. This reveals yet another 
difficulty. Which later Leibnizians are we to examine in this context? Some obvious candidates 
directly come to mind: Christian Wolff (1679–1754), the most well-known philosopher in early 
eighteenth-century Germany; Conrad Gottlieb Marquardt (1694–1749) and Martin Knutzen 
(1713–1751), Kant’s teachers in Königsberg; and Friedrich Christian Baumeister (1709–1785), 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–1777), and Johann 
 
 
1 More precisely, a computer count returns 495 hits for Leibniz in all of Kant’s writings (excluding the 
lecture notes). For comparison, Newton receives 275 hits, Descartes 225, and Hume 95. If one adds Wolff’s 
respectable 200 hits to Leibniz’s score, the importance of Leibniz-Wolffian ideas for Kant becomes even more 
evident. 
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August Eberhard (1739–1809), whose writings Kant used in his lectures2—but there are many 
more. A further difficulty is that Kant’s attitude towards the Leibnizian philosophy seems to 
have changed over time, and that this change appears not to be confined to the transition from 
the pre-critical to the critical period, i.e., the period after the publication of the Critique of Pure 
Reason in 1781, but to have continued in the critical period itself. This is puzzling because 
Kant’s critical philosophy is usually regarded as, by and large, stable (at least as far as his 
writings are concerned that were published during his lifetime), which makes it difficult to 
understand why he would continue to change his assessment of the Leibnizian philosophy.  
 In tandem with an increase in interest in Kant’s pre-critical philosophy, the question of 
Kant’s relation to Leibniz has received more and more attention in the scholarly literature over 
the last 30 years or so. Still, compared to other areas of Leibniz-, and certainly Kant-scholarship, 
the number of secondary titles dealing with their relation is vanishingly small, and it seems fair 
to say that the serious historical investigation of this topic is still in its infancy. Some useful 
initial pointers can be found in several survey articles,3 the sections on the relevant period in 
some standard histories of philosophy,4 or in more general works on either Leibniz or Kant,5 
and, in the latter category, in particular works dealing with Kant’s early philosophy.6 Thanks in 
part to the recent steady increase in interest in the Leibniz-Kant connection, there are also 
several helpful specialized studies, which investigate the Leibnizian background for certain 
Kantian doctrines or arguments,7 compare Leibniz’s (or Leibnizian) views and Kant’s views on a 
particular topic,8 or examine specific criticisms by Kant of certain Leibnizian teachings.9 But no 
detailed comprehensive study of the relation between Kant and Leibniz (and/or the Leibnizians) 
 
2 Kant used Baumeister for metaphysics; Baumgarten for metaphysics, moral philosophy, and 
anthropology; Meier for logic; and Eberhard for rational theology, whose name is also known through the later 
famous controversy between him and Kant, on which more below. Kant used Wolff as well, for mathematics and 
mechanical science. Baumeister’s Institutiones also were the textbook for Johann David Kypke’s metaphysics 
lectures (1692–1758), ordinarius at Königsberg in Kant’s student days. 
3 See Wolff, 1967; Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 2004. 
4 See Fischer, 1867; Überweg, 1924; Vorländer, 1903; Copleston, 1964. 
5 See Schmalenbach, 1921, pp. 500–588; Martin, 1967, pp. 211f. [appendix]; Allison, 1973; also see 
Heinekamp, 1986. 
6 See Polonoff, 1972; Laywine 1993; Schönfeld, 2000. 
7 See Lenders, 1971; Schönrich, 1992; Watkins, 1995; Thiel, 1996; Kuehn, 1997; Radner, 1998; Watkins, 
2003; Brogan, 2004. 
8 See Finster, 1982; Mittelstrass, 1985; Schneider, 2004; Sarmiento, 2005. 
9 See Parkinson, 1981; Kaehler, 1985; Wilson, 2005. 
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is available yet, and many aspects of this relation still await further illumination.10 The 
difficulties attending the project of clarifying Kant’s relation to Leibniz are compounded by the 
fact that much of early German philosophy in general still is underexplored territory. This 
applies both to the German school philosophy of the seventeenth century that is such an 
important background and source for both Leibniz and Wolff—and, mediated by them, for 
Kant—and to the philosophy of the German Enlightenment prior to Kant.11 To be sure, Wolff’s 
philosophy has received its share of attention, and Wolff scholarship has considerably gained in 
momentum over the last few decades—as is also reflected in the first International Wolff 
Congress that took place in Halle in 2004—so that a number of helpful studies on different 
elements of his system have accumulated by now.12 But much remains to be unearthed, and in 
light of his preeminent position in his time and his considerable historical significance, the 
secondary literature on Wolff is still surprisingly thin. Much more still needs to be learned also 
about Wolff’s followers and his opponents, including, in particular, Kant’s immediate 
interlocutors in Königsberg, all of whom are important potential sources of Leibnizian ideas for 
Kant.13 
 An exhaustive treatment of the relation between Leibniz and Kant would require a multi-
volume study—and, I fear, a lifetime of devotion to the project. So, providing such a treatment 
cannot be the goal of this essay. What I propose to do in the following is to sketch in general 
terms the main moments that characterize the relation between Kant, Leibniz, and the 
Leibnizians, viewed against the background of Kant’s philosophical development (section 2). 
This will be followed by a brief discussion of the main Leibnizian themes that play a role in 
Kant’s philosophy, again using Kant’s development as a rough ordering principle (section 3).  
 
 
10 An early, singular stab at a more comprehensive account is Nolen, 1875. 
11 Wundt, 1992a, and Wundt, 1992b, remain invaluable resources for a first orientation. Also useful for a 
general overview are Cassirer, 1951, and Wolff, 1963. The only reference work in English remains Beck, 1969. 
12 See Campo, 1939; Bissinger, 1970; Corr, 1982; Schneiders 1986; École, 1990; Paccioni, 2006; and 
Madonna, 2005. 
13 Of the few book-length works on Kant’s teachers, Erdmann’s study on Knutzen deserves to be singled 
out, See Erdmann, 1973. Also valuable in this respect are Kuehn, 2001a, and Kuehn 2001b. Many important 
background and source texts for Kant’s philosophy are collected in English translation in Watkins, 2009. 
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2. Kant, Leibniz, and the Leibnizians: an outline  
 A popular ‘quick-and-dirty’ story about Kant’s relation to Leibniz that is particularly 
prominent in the Anglo-American Kant-world goes something like this: Kant started out as a 
Leibniz-Wolffian by education, i.e., as a proponent of Leibniz’s philosophy in the form given to it 
by Wolff who systematized and popularized it and turned it into the most prominent 
philosophical system in Germany. Inspired by his encounter with the teachings of Newton and 
Hume, Kant then took on the project of reconciling Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics with 
Newtonian science and of responding to epistemological scepticism. This project led him 
further and further away from his Leibniz-Wolffian roots and culminated in the total rejection 
of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason as a prime example of 
illegitimate dogmatic metaphysics. This story has some modest merit as an initial, crude 
working hypothesis, but without several corrections and additional clarifications it is 
misleading, if not outright false, in a number of respects. In this section, I will highlight the four 
principal shortcomings of this story and briefly indicate how it might be amended and 
expanded in order to overcome them. Due to space constraints, my remarks will have to remain 
rather sketchy. 
 To begin with, the view that Wolff merely systematized and popularized Leibniz’s 
philosophy, although still a widespread prejudice in the philosophical community at large, can 
be challenged.14 It can be argued that, despite some undeniable common ground, there are 
significant differences between Wolff’s and Leibniz’s system, and that Wolff was not only 
influenced by Leibniz, but also (and arguably more so) by the earlier German school philosophy, 
by the Cartesians, especially Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708), whom Wolff 
knew personally, and even by (early) British empiricism. This is not the place to get into a 
detailed discussion of how exactly Wolff’s philosophy deviates from Leibniz’s—which, I should 
add, is a question that is far from settled in the secondary literature. But, just to list a few of the 
highlights, some of the differences that have been discussed concern their views on the nature 
and properties of the simple substances that constitute the fundamental ontological building 
 
14 See Arnsperger, 1897; École, 1964; Beck, 1969, pp. 256–75; Corr, 1974; Corr, 1975; Zingari, 1980; École, 
1990, esp. pp. 139–220; Schönfeld, 2002. 
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blocks of the universe (called ‘monads’ by Leibniz, and ‘elements’ by Wolff), the ontological 
status of bodies, the meaning and function of the doctrine of the pre-established harmony, and 
the relation between the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. The 
label ‘Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy’ might be defensible as a name for Wolff’s philosophy if it is 
understood as indicating that his system includes Leibnizian ideas (which Wolff freely admits)—
although even if understood in this sense it is misleading in creating the impression that Leibniz 
was Wolff’s main, or even only source. But Wolff is right to complain about the label, as he 
repeatedly does, if it is understood as indicating that his philosophy is more or less identical 
with Leibniz’s and that his own contribution is limited to casting this philosophy into a more 
systematic form.15 It is not entirely clear who coined the expression ‘Leibniz-Wolffian 
philosophy’, but, contrary to Wolff’s own fuzzy recollection, which blames Georg Bernhard 
Bilfinger (1693–1750), one of Wolff’s supporters, it seems to have originated with his enemies, 
which makes Wolff’s antipathy toward it even more understandable.16 Although Wolff might be 
slightly overstating his independence from Leibniz, he is, basically, on target when he says that, 
‘it is not really true that I have cast the Leibnizian philosophy into a distinct system, since very 
little that can be found in my Rational Thoughts on God, the World etc. belongs to Leibniz; 
several controversial things are taken from St Thomas rather than from Leibniz’ 
(Schutzschriften, welche zu der Grundwissenschaft gehören, p. 269, in Gesammelte Werke, 
I.xxi.iv), and that Leibniz’s system ‘only begins, where mine ends’ (Letter to Ernst Christoph Graf 
von Manteuffel, 11 May, 1746, cited in Wuttke, 1841, p. 82).  
 It is also worth mentioning that while one can justly say, given Wolff’s enormous success 
and following, that there is a philosophical school of thought that deserves the name ‘Wolffian 
philosophy’ or ‘Wolffianism’, one must guard against oversimplifying the actual historical 
situation by assuming that all Wolffians are committed to exactly the same principles and 
 
15 See Eigene Lebensbeschreibung, Wuttke, 1841, pp. 140–41. Also see Christian Wolffens Ausführliche 
Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schriften, in Gesammelte Werke I.ix, Preface. 
16 Franz Budde (1667–1729) uses the expression in his ‘Concerns about the Wolffian philosophy’ (1724), p. 
104, and it occurs in Andreas Rüdiger’s (1673–1731) ‘Opposed View’ (1727), Preface, §16–20. See Wundt, 1992, 
p.150 note. The label also appears in the titles of several later prominent books on Wolff, written during his 
lifetime, e.g., Georg v. Hartmann’s Guide to the History of the Leibniz-Wolffian Philosophy (1737), and Carl Günther 
Ludovici’s Latest Noteworthy Aspects [Merkwürdigkeiten] of the Leibniz-Wolffian Philosophy (1738). See Corr, 
1975, p. 243 note 8. 
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doctrines, namely, the ones presented in Wolff’s writings—although, of course, there were 
devoted Wolffians who followed the master in almost every detail, as, for example, Wolff’s 
student Ludwig Phillip Thümmig (1697–1728) who is the author of one of the first books on 
Wolffian philosophy, Institutiones Philosophiae Wolfianae (1725/26). Thümmig’s book was 
popular with many professors as a textbook for their lectures, including Karl Andreas Christiani 
(1707–1780), who taught at the university of Königsberg when Kant was a student there.17 A 
number of more entrepreneurial later Wolffians were not afraid to modify or develop Wolffian 
principles or combine them with ideas from other philosophers (or even with their own ideas). 
This led to versions of Wolffianism that are noticeably different from Wolff’s, e.g., 
Baumgarten’s, which is arguably more Leibnizian than Wolff’s,18 or the version by Knutzen, who 
famously argues against the pre-established harmony and defends a variant of the theory of 
physical influx.19 The recognition that there are non-negligible differences between the 
philosophies of Leibniz, Wolff, and the Wolffians is a necessary precondition for developing an 
adequate account of Kant’s relation to Leibniz. It remains to be worked out in detail what 
exactly these differences consist in. 
 Another problematic aspect of the popular story is that it creates the impression that 
Kant’s education and intellectual background in his early years had only one thing to offer, 
namely, Wolffianism, and that the young Kant was a card-carrying member of the Wolffian 
school who subscribed to the official party line. It is true that when Kant entered the university 
in Königsberg in 1740, Wolffianism was still going strong in Germany (and in Königsberg), even 
though the supremacy it had gained in the 20s—in part as a result of the publicity generated by 
the attack on Wolff’s philosophy by the pietists, led by Joachim Lange (1670–1744), Franz 
Budde, and Andreas Rüdiger, that culminated in Wolff’s expulsion from Prussia by King 
Frederick Wilhelm I under the threat of death by hanging—was beginning to fade. But by the 
time Kant published his first philosophical essay in 1755 (the Nova Dilucidatio [ND]), it seems 
 
17 The only other major work on Wolffian philosophy written in the 1720s is the Dilucidationes 
Philosophicae (1725) by Bilfinger, who also remains close to Wolff, although not as close as Thümmig. Bilfinger is 
also noteworthy in our present context because his writings are not only concerned with Wolff but also with 
Leibniz, whose philosophy he quite clearly recognizes to be distinct from Wolff’s. 
18 See Casula, 1979. 
19 See Knutzen, 1735. 
 7 
fair to say, the hegemony of Wolffianism had ended (as had Wolff’s life in 1754)—not because 
another philosophical school had successfully replaced it as the main paradigm of German 
philosophy, but because of the gradual erosion it had suffered due to criticisms from various 
sides, leaving a vacuum that was not to be filled again in a similar way by a single dominant 
philosophical system until Kant’s critical philosophy had completed its (initially only short-lived) 
victory march through the German lands. What one finds in Germany around the middle of the 
eighteenth century is a cacophony of many different philosophical positions, approaches, and 
ideas, all competing for the attention of Kant’s quick and eager young mind. (Kant’s stint as a 
private tutor (1747–1754), which falls into this period, must certainly still be counted as part of 
his education, despite the fact that he was no longer at the university—to which he returned in 
1754 to take his official degree, and which he never left again.) To be sure, Wolffian ideas 
retained their prominence in the public discussion inasmuch as many proponents of other 
views undertook to criticize them. And, of course, there were still plenty of Wolffians around 
too, including such ‘heavy-hitters’ as Baumgarten, who, however, by that time was primarily 
working on aesthetics (rather than more typical Wolffian topics in metaphysics), Johann 
Christoph Gottsched (1700–1766), now mainly known as one of the founders of German literary 
theory, and Carl Günther Ludovici (1707–1778), who wrote, among other things, a widely 
popular history of Wolffian philosophy. But Wolffianism was no longer the only, or even the 
most prized horse in the running, so to speak.  
 Of the many different philosophical camps at that time I will highlight a couple of 
important groups, whose ranks include two scholars who exerted an especially direct and 
clearly detectable influence on the young Kant. The first group consists of philosophers who 
stand in the tradition of Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), rightly considered the other main 
thinker (in addition to Wolff) to have shaped the German Enlightenment. In contrast to Wolff, 
Thomasius breaks rather sharply with the earlier school philosophy, with which Wolff’s 
philosophy shows many more affinities. Thomasius is an eclectic whose philosophy includes 
empiricist, psychologist, mystic, and, above all, humanist elements, combined with a strong 
concern to be practically relevant and generally accessible.20 The Thomasian tradition had its 
 
20 For more on Thomasius, See Vollhardt, 1997. 
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first run of success from about 1690 into the 1720s, when it was overpowered by Wolffianism, 
but experienced a series of second springs in different forms, as it were, after the Wolffian 
philosophy had begun to decline. For example, Thomasius’s influence is reflected in the 
‘popular philosophies’ of the free spirits populating the salons and coffee houses of Berlin and 
Göttingen in the later eighteenth century, and can also be detected in such anti-Enlightenment 
thinkers as Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788) and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819). 
During the time period that concerns us presently, the most important philosopher who can be 
regarded as representing the Thomasian tradition is Christian August Crusius (1715–1775), who 
proved himself an especially acute and influential critic of Wolffian doctrines. Crusius made a 
strong impression on Kant, who discusses his ideas at several places in his pre-critical works and 
his lectures, and who says of this ‘sharp man’ that ‘among the German philosophers, or rather 
those who lead philosophy forward, hardly a second can be placed next to him’ (ND, Ak I, p. 
397).  
 The second group to which I would like to call attention is the rather large anti-Wolffian 
faction in the Prussian Academy of Frederick the Great in Berlin, led by Pierre Louis Moreau de 
Maupertuis (1698–1759), who was the Academy’s president from 1746 till 1759. The Berlin 
Academy, which at the time looked a little like a local chapter of the French Academy, played an 
important role in the dissemination in Germany of the ideas of the French and British 
Enlightenment and of French and British innovations in mathematics and the natural sciences.21 
The anti-Wolffian leanings of many members of the Academy are manifested in several of its 
prize contests in the philosophical division. The prize question of 1746 asked the contestants to 
examine the theory of monads. Prior to the award of the prize, Leonhard Euler (1707–1783), 
who would succeed Maupertuis as the Academy’s president in 1759 and who shared 
Maupertuis’ anti-Wolffian sentiments, launched an attack on (what he took to be) the Wolffian 
theory of monads in his widely read ‘Thoughts on the Elements of Bodies’ (1746), which he 
published anonymously. Samuel Formey, long-time secretary of the Academy, whose claim to 
fame is a Wolffian compendium for the ladies, La Belle Wolffienne (!), replied to the attack, 
 
21 For more information on the Academy under Frederick and its warring factions, See Calinger, 1968a and 
1968b. 
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similarly anonymously, in his ‘Investigations on the elements of matter’ (1747), apparently 
drawn up with assistance from Wolff himself.22 Several others joined in the debate, and the 
prize contest was the talk of the day in the academic circles and salons of the town and beyond. 
After much lobbying by the anti-Wolffians, the winner was announced to be the essay by 
Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771), who argued against the theory of monads. Even 
Euler admitted later that Justi should have shared the prize with the Leibniz-Wolffian Gottfried 
Ploucquet (1716–1790), who had written a fine essay in support of the theory of monads and 
only received the accessit, i.e., honourable mention. The prize contest in 1755, thinly disguised 
as being about Pope’s optimism, but really directed at the Leibniz-Wolffian thesis that the 
actual world is the best of all possible worlds, was similarly suspiciously won by a (rather 
disappointing) anti-Wolffian entry, written in French. This caused much protest, including an 
anonymously published, controversial pamphlet, co-authored by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing 
(1729–1781) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), entitled ‘Pope a metaphysician!’ (1755), in 
which they disassociate Pope from Leibniz, and, more generally, poetry from philosophy, and 
make fun of the Academy. A number of Kant’s pre-critical essays address topics covered by the 
prize questions of the Academy—not all of which were submitted for the contests and none of 
which won; at least, his ‘Inquiry into the Distinctness….’ [‘Distinctness’] (published in 1764) was 
accorded the accessit.23 Especially noteworthy in our present context is Kant’s Physical 
Monadology [PM] (1756), clearly connected to the prize question from 1746. In this work, he 
confronts for the first time the problem concerning the relation of the structure of matter to 
the structure of space, which turned out to be a key problem in the development of his 
transcendental idealism. The Physical Monadology shows clear traces of Euler’s objections to 
the theory of monads from his 1746 essay, which can thus claim to have been an important 
influence on the young Kant.24  
 
22 See Harnack, 1900, vol. i, p. 402–403. 
23 Kant was inspired to work on an Academy contest topic only once more in his later life, in the 1790s, 
namely, on the question of what progress metaphysics has made in Germany since Leibniz and Wolff. 
24 Kant also knew Euler’s 1748 essay in support of the Newtonian theory of space and time; See ‘On the 
first ground of the distinction of directions in space’ [‘Directions’], Ak, II, p. 378. And in his Inaugural Dissertation 
[ID] he quotes with approval Euler’s Letters to a German Princess (1769), which contains many more objections to 
Wolffian teachings; See ID, Ak II, pp. 414, 419. Among Kant’s other essays on Academy prize questions one also 
finds a brief essay on optimism, which doubled as announcement for his lectures, in which he defends Leibniz and 
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 So, although there can be no question that Wolffianism was a strong presence in the 
intellectual milieu in which Kant developed, a presence that lasted throughout his formative 
years, he was also exposed to several competing views and to a multitude of explicit criticisms 
of Wolffian ideas. This is reflected in Kant’s early publications. While it is appropriate to 
describe them as composed within a broadly Wolffian framework, the influence of the anti-
Wolffian forces is clearly in evidence as well. Kant’s own early contributions to the philosophical 
debate are invariably critical of Wolffian doctrines, or, at least, involve significant modifications 
of them, as we will see in the following section. This means that the description of Kant as a 
Leibniz-Wolffian by education is highly misleading and ultimately indefensible. Further sorting 
out the complex tangle of philosophical views in circulation during Kant’s formative years, and 
identifying more precisely which of these views influenced Kant in exactly what ways are tasks 
for future research.  
 A further misleading feature of the popular story is that it misrepresents the role of 
Newton and Hume in Kant’s philosophical development, and underestimates the fecundity of 
the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy. Of course, it is indisputable that Newton and Hume did 
influence Kant in important ways. But, on my view, Newton’s role in the genesis of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy was fairly limited, and Hume’s influence did not get any real traction 
until fairly late, namely, the 1770s, i.e., after ‘the year 69’, of which Kant famously says that it 
‘gave [him] great light’ (R 5037, Ak XVIII, p. 69), and after the publication of the Inaugural 
Dissertation, by which time many important elements of the critical philosophy were already in 
place, including one of the core tenets of transcendental idealism, namely, the distinction 
between noumena and phenomena. Kant’s philosophical development was powered by a series 
of key problems that led him closer and closer to his critical philosophy, but the alleged conflict 
between Newtonian physics and Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics was not among them. Most of 
the philosophical problems that Kant grappled with in his pre-critical writings before the 
Inaugural Dissertation and that determined the path that eventually led him to the critical 
 
in which he refers to the winning essay of the corresponding academy contest in 1755; See ‘Attempt of a few 
observations concerning optimism’ (1759), Ak II, pp. 27–35. All references to Kant’s writings are to the Academy 
Edition, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, cited by volume and page number, except for references to the Critique of 
Pure Reason, which is cited according to the paginations of the first (A) and second (B) edition. All translations are 
my own. 
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philosophy were home-grown, so to speak, and internal to the Wolffian philosophy, even 
though some of them were brought to the attention of the scholarly community by anti-
Wolffians (sometimes even Newtonians), such as the problems with the theory of monads that 
Euler had identified in his pre-contest essay from 1746. These Wolffian problems include 
questions that were commonly discussed in Wolffian circles—be it because they were 
considered especially important, or because they had been left unanswered in Wolff’s writings, 
or because Wolff’s answers were found wanting—as well as more serious difficulties with 
particular Wolffian doctrines or principles, many of which were brought to prominence through 
the attacks against Wolffianism that led to its decline. These problems concern, for example, 
the possibility of a real connection of substances in one world, the nature of space, the 
structure of matter, and the individuation conditions of substances. The problems of reconciling 
the new deterministic science with a metaphysical view of the world that asserts the existence 
of final causes or purposes, human freedom, immortal souls, and God, and of providing 
metaphysical foundations for the new science, also belong on this list. It did not take 
Newtonian science for Kant (or anybody else) to realize that modern physics might pose certain 
challenges for traditional metaphysics; these problems had been recognized as soon as the new 
science had begun to take root in the 16th century, and they occupy a central position in 
Leibniz’s thinking as well.25 
 Scepticism arguably is one of the formative problems that shaped Kant’s thinking. But the 
form of scepticism that is most relevant in this context is not the kind of scepticism that Kant 
associates with Hume, but scepticism about the reliability of (pure) reason in general that finds 
expression in the so-called antinomies, i.e., in the four pairs of contradictory, yet provable 
statements (given certain assumptions) that we are inevitably stuck with unless, as Kant 
discovers, we adopt the transcendental idealist standpoint of the Critique of Pure Reason and 
regard empirical objects no longer as things in themselves but as appearances, i.e., as mind-
dependent entities whose properties depend on our cognitive make-up. As Kant puts it, ‘[t]he 
antinomy of pure reason—‘The world has a beginning-: it has no beginning etc. up to the fourth 
 
25 For a contrasting reading of Kant’s development that gives much more weight to Newton’s influence, 
See Adickes, 1924–25, Friedman, 1992, esp. pp. 1–52, and Schönfeld, 2002. 
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[sic]: There is freedom in human beings, -set against this one: there is no freedom, but all is 
natural necessity’—this was what first woke me from the dogmatic slumber and drove me to 
the critique of reason itself, in order to end the scandal of the seeming contradiction of reason 
with itself’ (Letter to Garve, 12 September, 1798, Ak XII, pp. 257–58).26 The antinomies, in turn, 
grow straight out of the confrontation of the Wolffian philosophy with its opponents in 
Germany in the middle part of the eighteenth century. Crusius’ teacher, Adolf Friedrich 
Hoffmann (1707–1741), is especially noteworthy in this context, since he arguably anticipated 
important aspects of the antinomies in his ‘Elements of proof of those basic truths of all religion 
and morality that are meant to be denied and abolished through the contradictions contained 
in the Wolffian philosophy’ (1736).27 And if any further impetus had been needed for Kant to 
confront this kind of scepticism about reason in general, Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), especially 
the articles on ‘Phyrro’ and ‘Zeno’ in his Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697, translated by 
Gottsched into German in 1744), would have been a more likely source than Hume. Put briefly, 
for Kant Hume’s scepticism is rather limited and principally concerns our knowledge of causal 
relations.28 This kind of scepticism became relevant for Kant’s philosophical development only 
after the publication of the Inaugural Dissertation in 1770, by which point Kant was already 
half-way home, so to speak. Hume’s scepticism about knowledge of causal relations as a result 
of the problem of induction ‘clicked’ with Kant’s own views only when he had recognized the 
importance of the problem of justifying the assumption that our a priori representations refer 
to objects, as dramatically described in his famous letter to Herz from 12 February, 1772 (Ak XI, 
pp. 129–134). This problem includes as a special case the problem of justifying the assumption 
that our a priori concept ‘cause’ refers to objects, which, in turn, is equivalent to Hume’s 
problem of justifying the assumption that nature is uniform, a problem that we would need to 
solve in order to be able to say that we can have knowledge of causal relations. So, while 
Hume’s problem, especially in its more general form, is a formative problem for Kant, the 
function of Hume’s analysis might best be understood as emphasizing the importance of the 
 
26 For more discussion of the important role of the antinomies in Kant’s development, See Erdmann, 1884. 
27 See Heimsoeth, 1926; Wundt, 1992, pp. 246–48. 
28 See Prolegomena, Ak IV, 257: ‘Hume based his investigation mainly on a single, but important concept 
of metaphysics, namely, the concept of the connection between cause and effect…’ 
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problem to Kant rather than first opening his eyes to it.29 
 As I see it, Newton’s influence on Kant is twofold. First, Kant was impressed by 
Newtonian science, and he incorporated many aspects of Newtonian physics into his own 
physical theory of the sensible world, although even here the situation is more complicated 
than the prevalent ‘slam dunk for Newtonianism’ reading lets on. Second, Kant drew inspiration 
from the Newtonians for the solution or alleviation of some of the problems that he had 
encountered in his Wolffian studies. For example, by conceiving of the forces of substances 
according to the Newtonian model as acting on other substances, rather than conceiving of 
them according to the Leibniz-Wolffian model (as understood by Kant) as acting exclusively 
internally, Kant was able to provide an improved explanation of the possibility of a real 
connection of substances in one world (and of ‘refuting’ idealism—or so he thought initially, at 
least for a short while).30 But Newton was not the only early modern thinker to have played 
such a suggestive, as opposed to formative, role in Kant’s thinking. Others who deserve to be 
mentioned in this context are Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), René Descartes (1586–1650), John 
Locke (1632–1704), the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Arthur Collier (1680–1732) George 
Berkeley (1685–1753), Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), 
Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777), Johannes Nikolaus Tetens (1736–1807), and, surprising 
as this may sound, Leibniz himself. Wundt uses the apt expression ‘Leibniz Renaissance’ 
(Wundt, 1992, p. 317) to describe the (re-)discovery of the ‘real’ (or, at least, ‘more real’) 
Leibniz in the second half of the eighteenth century who, due to the somewhat limited 
accessibility of his writings and Wolff’s absolute reign, had heretofore been largely unknown. 
But now the time was ripe for Leibniz’s ideas, some of which for the first time reached a wider 
audience through the publication of the multi-volume editions of his writings by Rudolf Erich 
Raspe (1765), which included, most importantly, the hitherto unpublished New Essays (which 
came out in German in 1768), and by Louis Dutens (1768). Also noteworthy in this context is 
Huth’s revised re-edition in 1740 of Heinrich Köhler’s selections of writings by Leibniz in 
German translation (originally published in 1720), including the Monadology and the Leibniz-
 
29 For a more detailed analysis of Hume’s influence, ascribing to it a more central role and dating it 
somewhat earlier, See Paulsen, 1876, pp. 125–45; and Kreimendahl, 1990. Also see Waxman, 2005. 
30 See ND, Ak I, esp. pp. 411f. 
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Clarke correspondence (with a preface by Wolff). To be sure, a number of important writings by 
Leibniz already had appeared previously. Apart from the selections by Köhler just mentioned, 
these include the Theodicy (1711), Leibniz’s only book that was published during his lifetime, 
and several essays that he had submitted to various academic journals such as the Acta 
Eruditorum or the Journal des Savants, including ‘Meditations on Cognition, Truth, and Ideas’ 
(1684), the first part of the ‘Specimen Dynamicum’ (1695), the ‘New system of the Nature and 
Communication of Substances’ (1695), which was known in larger circles due to Bayle’s 
discussion of it in note ‘H’ to the article ‘Rorarius’ in his Dictionary, ‘On Nature Itself’ (1698), 
and the ‘Principles of Nature and Grace’ (1718). Moreover, another collection of Leibniz’s 
writings, by Pierre Des Maizeaux, had come out in 1720, which, among other things, contained 
several of the previously published essays, the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, a number of 
letters (e.g., to Remond), and some reflections on Lock’s Essay. But during the heyday of 
Wolffianism the in principle availability of these resources does not seem to have had much of 
an impact on the scholarly debate in general. This changed, starting in the late 1760s. In 
contrast to Wolff’s influence, which was rapidly declining even further, Leibniz’s influence 
ascended to unprecedented heights Even the Prussian Academy sensed the changing of the 
tides. The only instruction for the essay contest in 1768 seems to have been ‘Eulogy on Leibniz’, 
which, not entirely surprisingly, was won by an essay praising Leibniz. It is not entirely clear 
when Kant perused the newly published Leibniz material, but it can be argued that the New 
Essays were partially responsible for the introduction of the all-important distinction between 
the sensible and intelligible world that he first articulated in the Inaugural Dissertation.31  
 So, all in all, the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy can be seen to play a much more central and 
active role in Kant’s philosophical development than the popular story suggests, while Hume 
and Newton play a different and, especially in Newton’s case, more limited role. In the 
following section, we will look at some of the main problems with the Wolffian philosophy that 
proved instrumental in steering Kant toward his critical philosophy. A more detailed, 
comprehensive defence of the sketched account of Kant’s philosophical development will have 
 
31 See Windelband, 1877, pp. 234–37; Vaihinger, 1881, e.g., p. 48. Further aspects of the influence of the 
New Essays on Kant are discussed in Tonelli, 1974. Also see Tonelli, 1963. 
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to wait for another occasion. 
 Last but not least, the popular story’s ascription to Kant of a wholesale rejection of the 
Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy in his critical period is cause for concern. A first problem is that it 
reinforces the widespread but false assumption that the transition from Kant’s pre-critical to his 
critical philosophy involves a radical break, while in truth it is fairly smooth with much common 
ground on both sides. More importantly for our present concerns, by indiscriminately lumping 
together Leibniz, Wolff, and the Wolffians, the popular story suggests that the mature Kant is 
equally opposed to all of them, which, however, can be contested. Although Kant rejects many 
central claims of the Wolffian philosophy—some of which he also attributes to Leibniz—there 
are also several passages in which he speaks in highly laudatory terms of Leibniz, going so far as 
to claim that the Critique of Pure Reason is ‘the true apology for Leibniz’ (‘On a Discovery…’ 
[‘Discovery’], Ak VIII, p. 250). In these passages, Kant defends Leibniz against his self-appointed 
disciples, in this case Eberhard, who had claimed that the Critique of Pure Reason contains, 
basically, nothing that Leibniz had not already said before, but who, on Kant’s view, 
misunderstood both the Critique and Leibniz.32 Kant maintains that a correct reading of Leibniz 
reveals that his own and Leibniz’s views are in fact very close, albeit not in the ways suggested 
by a confused Eberhard, and that with regard to many issues Leibniz had intended to say what 
Kant himself then made explicit in his critical philosophy. Specifically, Kant proposes to 
understand Leibniz’s emphasis on the importance of the principle of sufficient reason as an 
(implicit) recognition of the need for a special principle of justification for synthetic judgments, 
in addition to the principle of contradiction, which can only ‘ground’ analytic judgments.33 
Moreover, Kant argues that Leibniz should not be understood to hold that matter is literally 
composed of monads, but only that it is grounded in an intelligible unknowable substratum, 
which we are naturally compelled to conceive of as composed of simple parts.34 Accordingly, 
Leibniz’s proposal to treat space as ideal must also not be misunderstood to suggest a 
distinction between the ideal mathematical space of the geometer and the physical space of 
the actual world, which supposedly corresponds to the order of relations between things in 
 
32 See ‘Discovery’, Ak VIII, p. 247. 
33 See ‘Discovery’, Ak VIII, p. 248; Draft notes for ‘Discovery’, Ak XX, pp. 363–64. 
34 See ‘Discovery’, Ak VIII, p. 203. 
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themselves; rather, Leibniz should be read as proposing that space is the order of relations 
between appearances in the phenomenal world.35 Finally, what Leibniz dimly saw in his 
doctrine of the pre-established harmony between mind and body, Kant speculates, is the 
harmony between our two main faculties of knowledge, i.e., sensibility and the understanding, 
whose mutual correspondence, indeed, cannot be explained otherwise than by ascribing it to 
the purposeful arrangement of a divine designer.36 
 These passages are puzzling, precisely because they stand in uncomfortable tension with 
the more familiar, usually harshly critical remarks about the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy that 
dominate Kant’s discussion in the Critique of Pure Reason. I want to submit that in these pro-
Leibniz passages Kant is neither betraying an exceptionally bad memory with respect to his own 
earlier criticisms, nor is he joking or speaking ironically, nor is he simply trying to score some 
cheap shots against Eberhard. Rather, Kant ought to be taken at his word: by the late 80s—
possibly reinforced by a closer study of Leibniz’s now available writings, which, in turn, might 
have been reinforced by Eberhard’s accusations—he has come to believe that with respect to 
several central issues Leibniz’s philosophy, if properly understood, is very close to his own, if 
properly understood.37 This is not to say that Kant came to think that there are no significant 
differences between himself and Leibniz, or that none of his earlier criticisms of the Leibniz-
Wolffian philosophy affect Leibniz. But it is to say that he recognizes that at least some crucial 
criticisms apply only to Wolffian doctrines. 
 In addition to erroneously ascribing to Kant an indiscriminate rejection of all things 
Leibniz-Wolffian, the popular story also misleads with its suggestion that Kant’s reasons for this 
rejection are directly connected to his alleged general onslaught on traditional metaphysics and 
its aspiration to a priori synthetic cognitions of supersensible matters. It is, of course, correct 
that part of the main result of the Critique of Pure Reason is that such cognitions are 
impossible—a result that is not to be found anywhere in Leibniz’s writings and that represents 
 
35 See Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science [MFN], Ak IV, pp. 507–8; ‘Discovery’, Ak XIII, pp. 248–
49. 
36 See Letter to Marcus Herz, 26 May, 1789, Ak XI, p. 52; ‘Discovery’, Ak VIII, pp. 249–50. 
37 In fact, I even think that this assessment is, by and large, correct; but this is bound to be a controversial 
claim whose defence will have to wait until another occasion. 
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one of the respects in which Kant goes (far) beyond Leibniz, which, of course, he undisputedly 
and clearly does in several ways. But it is equally important to see that Kant shares the 
aspiration to cognize the supersensible, and that much of his subsequent work, in ethics as well 
as aesthetics, is devoted to the project of finding a different way of achieving precisely that. 
While theoretical cognition of the supersensible is not possible for us, we can cognize it ‘in a 
practical respect’, namely, (to make a long story very short) based on the factum of the moral 
law, which allows us to cognize freedom, and the demand of the highest good, i.e., of a state of 
the world in which morality is realized and in which happiness is in exact proportion to morality, 
which allows us to cognize God and the immortality of the soul.38 Through this methodological 
correction to Leibniz-Wolff, Kant opens up a different path to a similar destination, so to speak, 
namely, the cognition of the supersensible that represents the ‘final end’ of metaphysics 
(‘Progress’, Ak, XX, p. 295).39 As Kant remarkably puts it in a letter:  
‘I shall be permitted to state that my efforts, which so far have been directed at critique, are 
by no means intended to work against the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, as it might have 
appeared (for I have been finding it neglected for quite some time now). Rather they are 
intended to lead this philosophy through a roundabout route onto the same track of a 
schooled procedure, which these great men, it seems to me, judged superfluous, and by 
means of it [the procedure] to the very same end, but only through the combination of the 
theoretical philosophy with the practical—an intention that will become clearer if I live long 
enough to present metaphysics in the form of a coherent system, as I am planning to do.’ 
(Letter to Kästner, 5 August, 1790, Ak XI, p. 186) 
    
3. Leibnizian doctrines in Kant’s philosophy 
In this section, I will collect some of the main Leibnizian doctrines that play a significant 
role in Kant’s philosophy. This collection makes no claim to be exhaustive; and I shall not 
attempt to identify Kant’s sources for these doctrines, or sort out which philosophers Kant 
 
38 See ‘On Progress in Metaphysics…’ [‘Progress’], Ak XX, p. 295; Critique of Practical Reason, Ak V, pp. 47, 
48, 56, 122–34, 141ff.; Critique of Judgment, Ak VI, pp. 175f., 195f. 
39 See ‘Progress’, Ak XX, p. 260. 
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believes himself to be talking about, or determine whether these doctrines are actually to be 
found in the writings of the philosophers that Kant seems to take himself to be addressing. 
Having already noted the importance of these tasks within a more ambitious, comprehensive 
study of the relation between Kant and Leibniz, for our present purposes I will fall back on the 
blanket term ‘the Leibnizians’, which should be understood as intentionally vague between 
Leibniz, Wolff, or some later Wolffians or Leibnizians. I will focus on the most important 
Leibnizian doctrines that Kant explicitly objects to in his critical period and that played a part in 
leading him to his transcendental philosophy. The Leibnizian doctrines to be discussed (as 
understood by Kant) will be stated in italics at the beginning of the respective sections devoted 
to them; the order in which the doctrines are listed roughly corresponds to the order in which 
they took on importance in Kant’s philosophical development. 
1. The monadology, part I—the conception of substance: Substances are completely self-
sufficient and simple. (a) The complete self-sufficiency of substances means that all of their 
essential properties, including, in particular, their causal powers and forces, are intrinsic. (b) 
Since we know no other intrinsic properties apart from our perceptions and other mental 
powers, we must conclude that substances are monads, i.e., souls.40  
Kant focuses his critique on (a). (If (a) is false, it also no longer follows that substances 
are monads.) Kant’s main objection consists in giving a counterexample to (a). The essential 
properties of substances in space and time include forces of attraction and repulsion. But these 
forces are extrinsic properties. Hence, (a) is false.41 Kant’s view that all moving forces of 
substances, in particular, the forces of repulsion and attraction, are to be understood as 
extrinsic properties, goes at least as far back as 1755.42 Pinpointing exactly when he decided 
that these forces are part of the essence of a substance would require a more detailed 
discussion than I can give here. Suffice it to say that one finds a number of considerations in 
Kant’s writings of the 1750s that bear witness to his growing doubt about (a), including worries 
 
40 See B321–22/A265–66; ‘Progress’, Ak XX, pp. 284–85. 
41 See B321/A266; B330/A274; B339–42/A282–86; ‘Progress’, Ak XX, p. 283. In fact, Kant goes even 
further and asserts that substances in space ‘consist entirely of relations’ (B341/A285; also see B66–67). It takes 
some work to figure out in detail what exactly this is supposed to mean, which is why we will set it aside for now. 
42 See Universal History and Theory of the Heavens [UH], Ak I, pp. 234, 250; ND, Ak I, pp. 410; MP, Ak I, pp. 
481f. See already True Estimation of Living Forces [TE], Ak, I, p. 19f. 
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about the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, to be discussed below.  
 2. The pre-established harmony: The substances that make up one world are connected 
through a pre-ordained harmonious coordination of their perceptual states.43 
 In his critical works Kant does not bother to explicitly argue against the pre-established 
harmony and rejects it due to its implausibility, calling it ‘the most miraculous figment that 
philosophy has ever come up with’ (‘Progress’, Ak XX, p. 284). Kant’s main dissatisfaction, more 
explicitly articulated in his pre-critical works, seems to be that the pre-established harmony 
only yields ideal, as opposed to real, connections between substances, which is not robust 
enough for their collection to make up a genuine whole that can be counted as a world. In 
order to form a real whole, substances need to be really connected, namely, through physical 
dynamical interactions.44 For a while Kant even seems to have believed himself in the 
possession of an argument to the effect that the pre-established harmony is impossible. The 
basic premise of this argument is the claim that all moving forces, including the ones moving 
the mind, are essentially extrinsic in the sense that any change of any entity E requires E to be 
acted upon by an entity wholly distinct from E. This rules out the self-propelled evolution of the 
perceptual states of causally isolated substances that the pre-established harmony requires.45 
But by 1763, Kant has reversed himself on this point, stating explicitly that while ‘the state of 
matter can never be changed except by an external cause, the state of a spirit can also be 
changed through an inner cause’ (‘Attempt to introduce negative magnitudes into metaphysics’ 
[NM], Ak I, p. 192).  
3. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII): Individuals a and b are identical if, 
and only if, a and b are intrinsically indiscernible, i.e., if, and only if, a and b are indistinguishable 
as far as their intrinsic properties are concerned.  
Kant rejects PII by appeal to a thought experiment that represents a counterexample to 
PII. Imagine two intrinsically indiscernible individuals, e.g., two qualitatively identical drops of 
 
43 See B330–31/A274–75. 
44 See ND, Ak, p. 413; ID, Ak II, p. 409; ‘Progress’, Ak XX, pp. 283–84. Also see TE, Ak I, p. 22; UH, Ak I, p. 
332. 
45 See ND, IV, pp. 410–13. 
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water, that are located at different spatial positions. A situation like this is perfectly possible. 
Hence, PII is false.46 Kant’s dissatisfaction with PII can be traced as far back as 1755.47 
4. The monadology, part II—the composition of matter: (a) Matter is composed of 
monads, i.e., souls. Or, more weakly, (b) matter is composed of simple elements. 
Kant focuses his criticism on (b). (If (b) is false, (a) is false as well, assuming that souls are 
simple.) Before taking a look at this criticism, it is interesting to note that at least the pre-critical 
Kant does not seem to regard (a) as obviously more problematic than (b). He explicitly points 
out at several places that the fact that the soul is not matter does not imply that an appropriate 
aggregate of souls cannot be matter either.48 Turning to Kant’s objection to (b), in the critical 
period (b) appears as the thesis of the second antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason.49 Kant 
shows that the thesis as well as its anti-thesis (which implies that matter is not composed of 
simple elements and [is supposed to be understood as implying] that matter contains infinitely 
many parts) are false on the grounds that both are based on the same false transcendental 
realist presupposition, namely, that the magnitude of the multiplicity of parts in a given chunk 
of matter is determinate, in particular, that it is either finite or infinite. The presupposition is 
false, because material bodies are not things in themselves but appearances, which means that 
there are no prior parts that compose them. Although it is legitimate to say that matter is 
infinitely divisible, one cannot say that it is composed of an infinite number of parts. 
Appearances only have as many parts as we ‘give’ them by actually dividing them. In Kant’s 
words, ‘[t]he multitude of parts in a given appearance is in itself neither finite nor infinite, since 
appearance is nothing that exists in itself, and since the parts are first given through and in the 
regress of the decomposing synthesis, a regress that is never entirely given, neither as finite nor 
as infinite’ (B533/A505).50 
 The problem concerning the proper conception of the composition of matter is one of 
 
46 See B319–20/A263–64; B327–28/A271–72; B338/A282; ‘Progress’, Ak XX, p.282. 
47 See ND Ak II, pp. 409–10. 
48 See ‘Inquiry into the Distinctness…’ (1764) [‘Distinctness’], Ak, II, p. 293; Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766), 
Ak II, pp. 322, 328. 
49 See B462/A434. 
50 See B541–43/A513–15; A523–27/B551–56; Prolegomena, Ak IV, p. 342; MFN, Ak IV, p. 506; ‘Progress’, 
Ak XX, p. 289. 
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the most fruitful problems that Kant engaged with throughout his philosophical development, 
and one with respect to which he underwent several changes of mind. The form in which the 
problem exerted its greatest fascination on Kant is in the cast of an alleged clash of Wolffian 
metaphysics with geometry, which he addresses for the first time in the Physical Monadology 
(and which is reminiscent of Euler). At that time, Kant still believes (b) to be true—indeed, he 
provides a proof for it whose main idea is recycled later on in the proof of the thesis of the 
second antinomy.51 Kant’s purpose in the Physical Monadology is to show that, appearances to 
the contrary notwithstanding, (b) does not conflict with the theorem of geometry that space is 
infinitely divisible—a conflict that is also recycled later on, namely, in the proof of the anti-
thesis of the second antinomy. The conflict is said to arise because (b) implies that matter is not 
infinitely divisible, which, in turn, implies that space is not infinitely divisible either. Kant agrees 
with the first inference, but not the second. The latter inference depends on a certain view 
about how matter ‘fills’ space, namely, that for every region of space that is filled with matter 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the parts of space and the elements of matter. 
Kant rejects the inference by proposing an alternative view about how matter fills space. The 
elements of matter fill space, not by being coordinated with the parts of space, but through 
their forces of repulsion by means of which other elements are prevented from penetrating 
them. So, while it is true that the infinite divisibility of space implies that the spheres of activity 
of the simple elements of matter can be infinitely divided, this does not mean that the simple 
elements themselves are further divisible. This allows Kant to assert both that matter is 
composed of (a finite number of) simple elements, and that space is infinitely divisible.52  
 5. The principle of the non-opposition of realties (NO): Realities do not stand in opposition 
to each other, i.e., if one combines them in one subject their effects do not cancel each other.  
 Kant’s argument against NO is, again, an argument by counterexample. Imagine two 
moving forces that have the same non-zero strength but point in opposite directions. Since 
these forces have non-zero strength they must be counted as realities, but if they are combined 
 
51 See PM, Ak I, p. 477. 
52 See PM, Ak, I, pp. 475–83. Also see ‘Notes on Kästner’, Ak XX, pp. 421–22; ‘Distinctness’, Ak II, p. 287; 
MFN, Ak IV, p. 504. 
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in one subject, their effects cancel each other. Hence, NO is false.53 Kant talks about this kind of 
‘directional’ opposition, as one might call it, already in 1763 in his essay on negative 
magnitudes.54  
In order to see the wider relevance of Kant’s objection to NO it is worth spelling out 
NO’s most important corollary: If there is an opposition of properties, it is an opposition 
between a reality and its negation. Kant’s refutation of NO, and, with it, the corollary, has 
repercussions for a number of other Leibnizian doctrines that depend on the corollary, most 
prominently, the claim that evil is a mere privation or absence of good. If the corollary is false, 
the property of being evil might itself be a reality and not merely a privation, which, in turn, 
would have a number of interesting implications, e.g., it would make it even more difficult to 
devise a satisfactory theodicy.55 
6. The relationalist theory of space and time: (a) Substances are logically and 
ontologically prior to space and time. Space is an order in the community of substances and 
time is an order in the states of substances. (b) Our representations of space and time are 
empirical, confused concepts. The confusion explains why space and time are often regarded as 
being independent from substances.56  
In the critical period, Kant holds that, contrary to (a), space and time are logically prior 
to objects. While one cannot imagine that there is no space and time, one can imagine space 
and time without any objects in them.57 His main complaint about (b) is that it renders the a 
priori synthetic nature of the mathematical sciences unintelligible. The Leibnizians are caught in 
a dilemma. They can either choose to explain the applicability of the mathematical sciences to 
the world, i.e., their synthetic nature, by insisting that our representations of space and time, 
due to their empirical origin and despite their confusedness, properly capture the 
spatiotemporal structure of the physical world. But this leaves them without an explanation of 
the a priori character of the mathematical sciences. Or they can choose to explain the latter by 
 
53 See B320–21/A264–65; B328–29/A272–73. 
54 See NM, AK II, p. 171f. Directional properties also play a key role in Kant’s argument against the 
Leibnizian theory of space in his 1768 essay on the distinction of directions in space, on which more below. 
55 See B329/A273; ‘Progress’, Ak XX, pp. 282–83. 
56 See B323–24/A267–68; B331–32/A275–76. 
57 See B38–39/A24; B46/A31. 
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arguing that although we might initially acquire the representations of space and time on which 
the mathematical sciences are based only on the occasion of experience, these representations 
are nevertheless a priori and represent an ideal space and time that is distinct from the real 
space and time of the physical world. But now they are left without an explanation of the 
applicability of the mathematical sciences to the physical world.58 According to Kant, the only 
view of the nature and origin of our representations of space and time that allows us to account 
for the a priori synthetic character of the mathematical sciences is his own, according to which 
our representations of space and time are a priori intuitions that express the forms of our 
sensibility. Their a priori nature explains the a priori character of the mathematical sciences, 
and the fact that they express the forms of our sensibility explains their applicability to the 
physical world, because, as Kant shows in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, all empirical objects, i.e., all objects of experience, necessarily conform to the forms of 
our sensibility since only through sensibility can objects be ‘given to us’ in the first place.59  
 For most of the pre-critical period Kant subscribes to a relationalist theory of space (and 
does not say much explicitly about the nature of time). He identifies space with the totality of 
spatial relations between substances, which, in turn, are determined by their dynamic 
interactions.60 Kant’s conception of the nature of space undergoes a radical change in 1768 in 
the essay ‘On the first ground of the distinction of directions in space’, in which Kant argues 
against Leibnizian relationalism and for a version of absolutism about space based on the 
phenomenon of incongruent counterparts, i.e., objects that are similar in shape and equal in 
size but that cannot be brought into coincidence by rigid motions, e.g., a left and a right hand. 
Simplifying somewhat, he argues that the handedness of an object cannot depend solely on its 
spatial relations to other objects or the spatial relations among its parts by appeal to a thought 
experiment. Imagine the first object that was created to have been a human hand. Surely, this 
hand must have been either a left or a right hand. But, by stipulation, there was no other object 
around yet with respect to which the hand’s handedness could have been determined, and the 
 
58 See B56–57/A39–40. 
59 See B41–42; B56/A39; B65–66/A48; Prolegomena, Ak IV, pp. 280–94. 
60 See TE, Ak I, p. 22; UH, Ak I, p. 308; ND, Ak I, p. 414; PM, Ak I, p. 481; ‘The Only Possible Ground…’, Ak II, 
p. 71. 
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relations among the parts of a left hand are exactly the same as the relations among the parts 
of a right hand. Thus, the hand’s handedness had to be determined by something else, and that 
something else is its relation to absolute space, which, accordingly, must be assumed to exist.61 
Strictly speaking, what this argument establishes (assuming that it is sound, which can be 
debated) is not that absolute space exists, but that space is logically prior to, and independent 
of bodies. This is the part of the conclusion of the argument that Kant did not depart from 
anymore for the rest of his life. But he quickly departed from absolutism about space, namely, 
only two years later, in his Inaugural Dissertation, in which he presented an idealist theory of 
space and time, which already incorporates many features of his later critical theory. 
 7. Sensibility and the understanding: We have only one basic faculty of representation. 
The only difference between sensibility and the understanding concerns the degree of 
confusedness of their respective representations. Sensible representations are confused 
concepts.62  
 The criticism of the Leibnizian philosophy that occurs most frequently in Kant’s critical 
writings is that this Leibnizian conception of the difference between our sensible and 
intellectual faculty of cognition and, accordingly, between sensible and intellectual 
representations, is deeply mistaken. The Leibnizians conceive of the difference as a merely 
‘logical’ one, as Kant puts it, while in truth it is a difference in kind. Our faculty of cognition 
comprises two distinct stems, an active one, the understanding, and a passive one, sensibility, 
each of which has its distinctive important contribution to make for cognition to be possible for 
us.63 For ease of communication, I will call this Leibnizian mistake the ‘Misconception’. In Kant’s 
judgment, the Misconception is the most fundamental mistake of the Leibnizians, because most 
of their other mistakes depend on it in some way. At many places where Kant brings up the 
Misconception, he uses it to develop an error theory, as one might put it, to explain how the 
Leibnizians, who, after all, are smart people, could have endorsed so many false doctrines. 
Incidentally, this is the less flattering part of the ‘apology’ of Leibniz that Kant offers with the 
 
61 See ‘Directions’, Ak II, pp. 381–84. 
62 See B332/A276. 
63 See B29/A15; B74–76/A50–52; Anthropology, Ak VIII, pp. 140–41. 
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Critique of Pure Reason. I will confine myself to presenting the most important error here, one 
whose recognition is also the next crucial step in Kant’s philosophical development as we have 
so far traced it.  
  The most portentous mistake of the Leibnizians that follows from the Misconception is 
that they confuse noumena or intelligible objects with phenomena or sensible objects. That is, 
they fail to realize that the objects that our sensible representations present to us are distinct 
(type-type and token-token) from the objects that we can (fully) represent in purely conceptual 
terms. Kant calls this mistake a ‘transcendental amphiboly’, which he explains as a ‘confusion of 
the pure object of the understanding with the appearance’ (B326/A270). Kant introduces the 
distinction between sensible and intelligible objects in his Inaugural Dissertation where he also 
articulates the Misconception objection for the first time.64 In the Dissertation, Kant still 
believes that we can acquire knowledge about noumena, namely, in terms of pure concepts 
through the use of our intellectual faculty of cognition (which is why these objects are called 
‘noumena’ or ‘intelligible objects’). One of the main changes in his thinking that takes place in 
the (almost) silent decade between the publication of the Dissertation and the publication of 
the Critique is that this belief is given up. Things in themselves, which are the heirs of the 
noumena from the Dissertation, so to speak, are not only beyond the reach of our sensible 
knowledge, they are beyond the reach of our knowledge in general. But the complaint about 
the Leibnizian conception of sensibility and its relation to the understanding remains:  
‘The Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, thus, gave a completely illegitimate perspective to all 
investigations concerning the nature and origin of our cognitions, in that it considered the 
difference between sensibility and the intellectual as merely logical, even though it is 
obviously transcendental and does not merely concern the form of distinctness or 
indistinctness [of representations] but their origin and content, such that by means of the 
former we do not merely cognize the nature of things in themselves indistinctly but rather 
not at all, and as soon as we take away our subjective nature, the represented object with 
the properties that sensible intuition gave to it, is nowhere to be found, nor can be found, 
 
64 See ID, Ak II, p. 395. 
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insofar as this subjective nature precisely determines it as appearance.’ (B61–62/A43–44)65 
 The Leibnizian confusion of phenomena with noumena lies at the heart of what Kant calls 
‘the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’, which is the key ingredient in his error theory for 
a number of central Leibnizian doctrines.66 The details are a bit complicated and do not have to 
concern us here. The bottom line of Kant’s diagnosis is that because of their failure to realize 
that phenomena and noumena are distinct kinds of entities and their privileging of our 
intellectual faculty of cognition in their theory of the mind, the Leibnizians were led to believe 
that certain principles that can be deduced if one considers objects in purely conceptual terms 
are universally valid, even though, in truth, these principles are valid only for noumena, i.e., for 
things in themselves as naturally conceived by us according to pure concepts (which, nota bene, 
does not mean that they are provably valid for things in themselves). These principles include 
PII, NO, the thesis that the essence of a substance comprises only intrinsic properties (and, with 
it, the pre-established harmony), and the central tenet of the relationalist theory of space and 
time that substances are logically and ontologically prior to space and time. And although Kant 
does not explicitly discuss the thesis of the composition of matter by simple elements in the 
‘amphiboly’ chapter of the Critique, the same kind of error theory also applies in this case, as 
Kant himself indicates at several other places. If objects are only considered in terms of pure 
concepts, one can indeed prove, Kant believes, that there must be simple elements in the world 
in order for there to be anything at all. But the thesis is not valid for sensible objects or 
appearances, which exist in space and, thus, inherit space’s structural features, including its 
divisibility in infinitum and the priority of the whole compared to its parts.67 (And, as we have 
seen, the thesis is also not provably valid for things in themselves. If it were assumed (with the 
Leibnizians and the Kant of the Dissertation) that how we conceive of things in themselves in 
terms of pure concepts is actually how they are, it could be concluded that the Leibnizian 
principles in question are valid for things in themselves. But the critical Kant does no longer 
share this assumption.) In sum, the problems with all of the six Leibnizian doctrines that we 
considered above can be traced back to the Leibnizian misconception of the relation between 
 
65 See Prolegomena, Ak IV, p. 290; Progress, Ak, XX, p. 278. 
66 See B316–46/A260–89. 
67 See MFN, Ak IV, pp. 507–8; ‘Discovery’ Ak VIII, pp. 201, 209–210. 
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sensibility and the understanding and the concomitant failure to properly distinguish between 
things in themselves and appearances. Put positively, the problems can be solved by adopting 
the standpoint of transcendental idealism, whose central tenet is that empirical objects are not 
things in themselves but appearances, which illuminates how the listed doctrines and Kant’s 
objections to them contributed to his gradual ascension to this standpoint.  
 8. Truth and its consequences: A judgment (proposition) is true if, and only if, the 
predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. This implies: (a) All true judgments are 
analytic. (b) There is a reason for every truth. And, hence, (c) every event has a cause. 
 Kant agrees that the containment of the predicate concept in the subject concept is 
necessary and sufficient for the truth of analytic judgments, which, accordingly, can be proved 
a priori through conceptual analysis by application of the principle of contradiction alone. But in 
his critical period, Kant disagrees with (a), the claim that all true judgments are analytic. For 
some true judgments, namely, the synthetic ones, it is not the case that the predicate concept 
is contained in subject concept. Accordingly, the principle of contradiction is not a sufficient 
basis for the justification of synthetic judgments. And while it is fairly obvious that a posteriori 
synthetic judgments rely on experience as their justifying ground, the question of whether and 
how a priori synthetic judgments can be justified, especially the kind of judgments that cover 
the pages of traditional metaphysical text books, requires a much deeper investigation, an 
investigation that occupied Kant during his silent decade and is a central concern of the Critique 
of Pure Reason. Kant repeatedly stresses that the failure to draw the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgments, and, accordingly, the failure to raise the question of how 
synthetic judgments a priori are possible, is what prevented previous philosophers, in 
particular, the Leibniz-Wolffians, from appreciating the importance of subjecting pure reason to 
a critique.68  
 In contrast to his rejection of (a), Kant endorses (b), the claim that every true judgment 
has a ground for its truth, which he regards as a general logical principle.69 But he insists on the 
important difference between this logical version of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) and 
 
68 See B13; ‘Progress’, Ak XX, p. 265. 
69 See Logic, Ak, pp. 51–53. 
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the causal version expressed in (c). The thesis that every event has a cause is a substantive, 
synthetic a priori principle about objects and the nomological structure of the world. The causal 
version of PSR does not follow from (b) (or the principle of contradiction, as some Wolffians had 
tried to establish) and stands in dire need of justification, as also shown by Hume.70  
 It is not entirely clear when exactly Kant discovered the existence of true synthetic 
judgments (and recognized them as such), and when he succeeded for the first time in clearly 
formulating the analytic-synthetic distinction. He had approached relevant territory already in 
his 1764 prize essay, but the first explicit discussion in his published works occurs in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. His concerns about the justification for the causal version of PSR and his 
puzzlement about the difference between the relation of a cause to its effect and the relation 
of a subject to the properties that can be predicated of it in an analytic judgment go back at 
least as far as 1763.71 
There are many more Leibnizan themes and doctrines that left their mark on Kant’s pre-
critical and critical philosophy, both as (eventual) targets for criticism and as sources of 
inspiration. To name only a few examples, the further targets include the Leibnizian proofs for 
the existence of God, Leibnizian compatibilism about freedom and determinism, and Leibniz’s 
theodicy. Among the sources of inspiration are Leibniz’s theory of innate ideas, which bears 
striking resemblance to Kant’s critical account of the original acquisition of our representations 
of space and time and the pure concepts of the understanding, and Leibniz’s doctrine of the 
harmony between the order of efficient causes and the order of final causes as well as between 
the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace. This doctrine is the constant background to 
Kant’s (critical) moral philosophy and his discussion in the Critique of Judgment. Without 
question, Kant’s engagement with the Leibnizian philosophy was deep and lasting, as was the 




70 See Prolegomena, IV, pp. 270, 271, 368; ‘Discovery’, Ak VIII, pp. 193ff., pp. 239ff.; Letter to Reinhold, 12 
May, 1789, AA XI, pp. 36–37; ‘Progress’, Ak XX, 277–78. 
71 See NM, Ak II, p. 202. Also see ND, I, 391–98. 
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